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Abstract 
A tractable general equilibrium model is developed to analyze the welfare implications of a 
biofuel blend mandate and consumption subsidy in the presence of pre-existing labor and fuel 
taxes. The tax interaction and revenue recycling effects are significant relative to the overall 
costs of the policies and to previous partial equilibrium studies. We estimate the welfare effects 
of removing a tax credit which is used in combination with a binding mandate, which mirrors the 
expiration of the U.S. blender’s tax credit at the end of 2011. Because the mandate was binding, 
removing the tax credit yields a net welfare gain of only $9 million, which is significantly less 
than the welfare gain of $357 million due to fiscal interaction effects. We find that the welfare 
cost of the blend mandate alone is $8.3 billion, which includes a tax interaction effect of $1.54 
billion. We also find empirically that the tax credit is welfare superior to the mandate for a given 
level of ethanol consumption because the fuel tax is above the external costs of GHG emissions. 
This result is robust to the presence or absence of the labor tax. 
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I. Introduction
 
 
Biofuel blend mandates and consumption subsidies are used throughout the world. 
Although the U.S. blender’s tax credit expired at the end of 2011, many other countries continue 
to employ tax-exemptions at the gasoline pump. In this paper, we derive and compare the 
welfare costs and benefits of biofuel blend mandates, consumption subsidies, and their 
combination using a closed-economy, general equilibrium model. This allows us to focus on the 
interactions of biofuels policies with the labor market and fixed fuel tax. Following other studies, 
(e.g., Cui et al. 2011, Lapan and Moschini 2012), we assume the only environmental benefit of 
the ethanol policies is to reduce the greenhouse gas (GHG) intensity of the fuel blend.
1
 Unlike 
Cui et al. (2011) and Lapan and Moschini (2012), we keep the price of gasoline fixed and ignore 
terms of trade effects in oil imports and corn exports. This allows us to isolate the tax interaction 
and revenue recycling effects and compare their relative importance. 
The first part of our paper develops a theoretical general equilibrium model with a pre-
existing labor tax which can be used to analyze the fiscal interaction effects of U.S. ethanol 
policies and their implications for the policies’ welfare effects. The model also includes a 
volumetric fuel tax. A rich literature in public finance and environmental economics has shown 
that the interaction of environmental policies with the broader fiscal system can significantly 
affect welfare measures in the context of environmental externalities (e.g., Bovenberg and de 
Mooij 1994, Parry 1995, Goulder et al. 1999, Parry and Small 2005, West and Williams 2007). 
The tax interaction effect arises when biofuel policies change the relative commodity 
prices (corn and fuel, in our model) with respect to the price of labor which in turn affects 
demand for leisure, labor’s substitute. This first-order welfare effect due to a change in the labor 
                                                          
1
 This simplifying assumption ignores other environmental externalities associated with fuel consumption, including 
traffic congestion, motor vehicle accidents, or local air pollution (Parry and Small 2005, Parry et al. 2007, Khanna 
2008; de Gorter and Just 2009b; 2010a; 2010b), as well as the concerns related to energy security. 
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tax base occurs because of the pre-existing distortion in the labor market (Browning 1987, Parry 
1995). The revenue-recycling effect arises because biofuel policies affect government revenue 
from the fuel market, and fuel market revenue is a substitute for labor tax revenue. Assuming 
that the level of total government spending will be held fixed, a biofuel policy which increases 
(decreases) government revenue from the fuel market will cause a decrease (increase) in the 
labor tax rate. The welfare effect of such a change in the labor tax is known as the “revenue-
recycling effect” (Goulder 1995). 
In the second part of the paper, we use a numerical version of the model that is calibrated 
to the U.S. in 2009 to investigate how important fiscal effects are relative to the overall welfare 
effects of the biofuel policies. If fiscal interaction effects are relatively large, research efforts 
which ignore them may overestimate the net benefits of the policies (if the fiscal interaction 
effects are negative), or underestimate the benefits (if the policies yield a “double dividend” – 
i.e., their net fiscal interaction effects are positive (Bento and Jacobsen 2007, Parry and Bento 
2000). 
In our first stage of analyzing the numerical model, we determine the optimal level of the 
tax credit or mandate, and we find that both policies would optimally be zero. This result is 
primarily due to rectangular deadweight costs (RDC) resulting from ‘water’ in the ethanol price 
premium (the gap between the free market ethanol price and the intercept of the ethanol supply 
curve). 
We perform three other types of policy analysis using the numerical model. First, we 
study the welfare effects of removing a tax credit which is used in combination with a binding 
mandate (which mirrors the expiration of the U.S. blender’s tax credit at the end of 2011). We 
find that removing the tax credit while keeping the mandate in place results in a welfare 
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improvement of $9 million.  Next, we analyze the welfare effects of the blend mandate alone. 
We find that the mandate imposes a welfare cost of $8.3 billion relative to an equilibrium where 
there is no ethanol policy.  In these policy analyses, we make use of results from our theoretical 
model which allows us to separate the total welfare effect into four components: the primary 
distortion, the two fiscal interaction effects, and an externality effect. We find that most of the 
mandate’s cost can be attributed to the primary distortion, although the tax interaction effect of 
$1.54 billion is also significant.  Our finding that the status quo policies incur significant welfare 
costs corroborates our finding that the optimal policies are both zero. 
Our third policy analysis compares the welfare with a blend mandate to the welfare with 
a tax credit that yields the same ethanol production. The question of which policy is superior has 
important implications for all countries which use biofuel policies, and our paper is the first to 
compare them in a general equilibrium framework. Theoretical partial equilibrium models 
(Lapan and Moschini 2012, de Gorter and Just 2010b) have shown that the mandate is superior 
to the tax credit on a welfare basis. Lapan and Moschini (2012) derive the first-best combination 
of fuel tax and ethanol subsidy and the second-best optimal ethanol subsidy or mandate alone. 
They find that the optimal second-best mandate (expressed as a combination of a fuel tax and 
ethanol subsidy) welfare dominates the optimal second-best subsidy alone. We cannot compare 
the mandate and the tax credit on the basis of welfare at their optimal levels – as analyzed by 
Lapan and Moschini (2012) – because we find both policies to be zero in the optimum due to 
RDC. 
When we compare the welfare associated with the tax credit and mandate for the same 
ethanol production, we find empirically that the blender’s tax credit is welfare superior to the 
mandate. This ordering is found to hold regardless of RDC. This is a novel result, since de Gorter 
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and Just (2010) conclude that a mandate always welfare dominates the tax credit, given the same 
ethanol production. Our finding that the tax credit welfare dominates the mandate is driven by 
the fact that the fuel tax exceeds the marginal external cost of GHG emissions and so is 
superoptimal. Because the mandate by itself acts as an implicit tax on fuel consumption, its 
implementation on top of a superoptimal fuel tax makes it even more distortionary. On the other 
hand, because the tax credit lowers the fuel price, it works in the opposite direction and brings 
the effective fuel tax closer to its optimal level. When we compare the policies in a framework 
where there is no fuel tax, we find that the mandate is slightly superior to the tax credit. 
Previous research has shown that differences in environmental policies’ effects on 
government revenue can influence their welfare ordering (Goulder et al. 1997, Goulder et al. 
1999). There are several inherent differences between biofuel blend mandates and consumption 
subsidies that make their fiscal interaction effects likely to differ. For example, although both the 
tax credit and mandate are revenue-requiring policies for a given level of ethanol (since fuel tax 
revenue declines with a mandate), the relative fiscal effects are a priori indeterminate.  Fuel 
prices are always relatively higher under a mandate, and corn prices are the same for a given 
level of ethanol production, which implies that the mandate has a more costly tax interaction 
effect. We compare the mandate to the tax credit in a framework with a fuel tax but no pre-
existing labor tax, and we find that the tax credit is still superior in this case. 
The majority of literature studying the welfare effects of biofuel policies has taken a 
partial equilibrium approach (Rajagopal et al. 2007, Khanna et al. 2008, de Gorter and Just 
2009b, Cui et al. 2011, Lapan and Moschini 2012). Several partial equilibrium studies 
numerically estimate optimal biofuel policies and find varying results, due largely to their 
inclusion of different externalities. For example, Khanna et al. (2008) use a partial equilibrium 
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model to analyze the first and second best policies to address congestion and emissions 
externalities arising from consumption of vehicle-miles-traveled (VMT), including various 
combinations of the ethanol subsidy, fuel tax, and a VMT tax. They find that the first-best policy 
combination includes a negative ethanol subsidy – a $0.04/gallon tax – and that introducing an 
ethanol subsidy of $0.51/gallon (in place in 2008) decreases welfare if the fuel tax is held 
constant, since the ethanol subsidy decreases the price of the fuel blend and worsens the 
congestion externality. On the other hand, Vedenov and Wetzstein (2008) assume that ethanol 
consumption improves environmental quality and fuel security relative to gasoline; they follow 
an approach similar to Parry and Small (2005) and find that the optimal ethanol subsidy is 
$0.22/gallon. 
Cui et al. (2011) analyze optimal biofuel policy in the presence of an emissions 
externality only and find that the optimal tax credit is $0.67/gallon in 2009 (35 percent greater 
than its actual level of $0.49/gallon) and that the optimal mandate yields even greater ethanol 
production than the optimal tax credit. Although our empirical model includes the same 
externality and is calibrated to 2009 U.S. data, we find the optimal tax credit or mandate to be 
zero. There are three main drivers of this difference. First, ethanol polices in the Cui et al. model 
derive additional benefits from the terms of trade effects in the oil and corn markets.
2
 Because 
ours is a closed economy model, we do not capture these effects. On the other hand, we focus on 
understanding the relative importance of fiscal interaction effects – a welfare component not 
analyzed in Cui et al. (2011). Second, our ethanol policies have greater welfare costs because we 
interact them with a pre-existing labor tax and fixed government revenue requirement. Finally, 
                                                          
2
 Previous literature about the welfare effects of biofuel policy has also discussed the issue of “leakage” in the corn 
(e.g., Al-Riffai et al. 2010) and ethanol (Drabik et al. 2010; Rajagopal et al. 2011; Khanna 2012) markets and 
suggested that the leakage may be a significant component of welfare. Although we do not analyze leakage in this 
paper, in Section VI we do discuss the implications of leakage on the change in fuel tax revenue due to biofuel 
policies. 
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the status quo ethanol policies in Cui et al. (2011) are associated with lower deadweight costs 
because of the absence – relative to our model – of RDC. 
Although the literature on fiscal interaction effects is extensive, few papers have 
measured the fiscal interaction effects of biofuel policies.
3
 Crago and Khanna (2012) study the 
welfare effects of a carbon tax where a pre-existing ethanol subsidy and labor tax may be 
present; our approach here is to study the welfare effects of ethanol policies directly. Devadoss 
and Bayham (2010) also use a general equilibrium model to analyze welfare effects in biofuels 
markets, but they study the effect of the U.S. crop subsidy rather than the biofuel policy directly, 
and they do not have a labor market distortion. 
Taheripour and Tyner (2012) analyze the welfare effects of an ethanol quantity mandate 
in an open-economy general equilibrium framework using the GTAP-BIO-AEZ Model. They 
model the mandate by imposing one of three combinations of market incentives necessary to 
induce the mandated quantity of ethanol: (i) a revenue-neutral combination of fuel tax and 
ethanol subsidy, (ii) eliminating agricultural production output subsidies while changing the 
ethanol subsidy and fuel tax, (iii) eliminating agricultural production output subsidies and paying 
for the ethanol subsidy with an income tax increase. In this paper, we use a different approach 
and implement the blend mandate directly—that is, we do not require any additional policies to 
impose the policy. 
Overall, our paper contributes to the biofuels policy literature in two ways. First, we 
estimate the welfare effects of the tax credit and mandate using a general equilibrium model that 
allows us to estimate the fiscal interaction effects of each policy. We find that the fiscal 
interaction effects are significant relative to the overall costs of the policies.  Because the tax 
                                                          
3
 Studies that have analyzed the fiscal interaction effects of agricultural policies include Parry (1999) and Taheripour 
et al. 2008). 
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credit was not the binding policy in most of 2009, its removal yields a total welfare gain of only 
$9 million; however, the net fiscal interaction effect of this policy shock is considerably higher 
and represents a gain of $357 million. The welfare cost of the remaining mandate is $8.3 billion, 
which includes a tax interaction effect of $1.54 billion. Our second finding is that the tax credit is 
welfare superior to the mandate for the same ethanol production when the fuel tax is 
superoptimal. This extends the partial equilibrium results of de Gorter and Just (2010b). 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we build an 
analytical closed economy general equilibrium model with corn and labor as inputs, ethanol and 
gasoline as intermediate goods, and corn, fuel, and a numeraire good as the final goods. The 
model captures the trade-off between corn used to produce fuel and corn used for direct 
consumption. In Section III, we derive analytical expressions for the marginal welfare effects of 
each biofuel policy independently as well as effects of the tax credit applied in the presence of a 
binding mandate.  Section IV presents a numerical version of the model; the data and calibration 
method for the numerical model are presented in Section V. Section VI presents our results, and 
Section VII provides some concluding discussion and remarks. 
II. Analytical Model  
The Representative Consumer 
The representative consumer consumes fuel F, corn C, numeraire good x, and leisure N.
4
 
Leisure is assumed to be weakly separable from consumption of goods in utility. The consumer 
receives disutility σ (.) from an externality R associated with fuel consumption; the externality is 
separable from consumption in utility. The utility function is given by 
                                               , , ,U u F C x N R                                               (1) 
                                                          
4
 Fuel is a mixture of ethanol and gasoline. Because one gallon of ethanol has lower energy content than the same 
amount of gasoline, we measure fuel consumption in gasoline energy-equivalent gallons (GEEGs). 
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where φ (.) denotes utility from the consumption goods and leisure. 
Production 
Labor is the only factor of production, and the representative consumer’s time 
endowment is L . The consumer allocates his time between labor L and leisure such that
L N L  . Labor is used in the production of gasoline G, ethanol e, corn supply C
S
, and the 
numeraire good.  The quantities of labor used to produce each good are LG, Le, LC, and Lx, 
respectively. The wage rate is denoted by w.
 
Gasoline and the numeraire are produced by constant returns-to-scale production 
technologies. We assume perfect competition in the production of both goods, so the prices of 
gasoline and the numeraire depend only on the wage rate. Corn is produced using labor 
according to a decreasing returns-to-scale technology f (.) 
                                                         S CC f L                                                         (2) 
Profits from corn production are denoted by
C and are returned lump-sum to the consumer.
5
 
Ethanol e (quantity measured in physical gallons) is produced from corn and labor 
according to a fixed coefficients production process 
                                                   min ,eC L ee e C e L                                                         (3)      
where C
e
 is the residual corn supply after corn consumption demand is met: C
e
 ≡ CS – C; the 
parameter eC denotes total gallons of ethanol produced from one bushel of corn, and eL denotes 
gallons of ethanol produced per unit of time. When calibrating the model to observed data, we 
assume that the co-product from ethanol production (Dried Distillers Grains with Solubles) is a 
perfect substitute for corn. 
                                                          
5
 Positive profits in corn production follow from our definition of the ethanol supply curve as the horizontal 
difference between the corn supply curve and the non-ethanol demand curve for corn. The positively sloped corn 
supply curve implies positive profits. 
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 The zero profit condition for ethanol production determines the link between ethanol and 
corn prices, denoted by Pe and PC, respectively
6
 
                                                        Ce
C L
P w
P
e e
                                                          (4) 
The link between the amount of labor and corn needed to produce e gallons of ethanol is 
obtained from cost minimization 
                                            e SC C L ee e C e C C e L                                                (5) 
The consumer buys a blend of gasoline and ethanol. We assume that the consumer values 
fuel for miles traveled. Since one gallon of ethanol yields fewer miles traveled than a gallon of 
gasoline, we let γ denote the ratio of miles traveled per gallon of ethanol and gasoline. Total fuel 
consumption measured in gasoline energy-equivalent gallons (GEEGs) is then given by F = G + 
γe. Following de Gorter and Just (2008), in our numerical model we assume that γ = 0.7. 
Throughout our analysis we use E = γe to denote ethanol measured in GEEGs. We assume that 
the fuel blend is produced by competitive blenders earning zero profits who face exogenous 
gasoline market price PG and the ethanol market price PE = Pe/γ, where PE denotes the ethanol 
price in $/GEEG.  
Externalities 
Fuel consumption is assumed to produce only one externality, carbon dioxide (CO2) 
emissions; we allow the emissions per consumed GEEG to differ between ethanol and gasoline.
7
 
We normalize the units of CO2 emissions so the externality can be written as  
                                                          
6
 The parameter eC takes into account the effect of the ethanol co-product on the corn price. 
7
 Other externalities associated with fuel consumption, such as traffic congestion or motor vehicle accidents, arise 
from vehicle-miles traveled (VMT) rather than fuel combustion.  If ethanol is measured in GEEG, its VMT 
externalities do not differ from those of gasoline.  In our model, the only potential benefit from ethanol relative to 
gasoline is reducing emissions (see also footnote 1). In our numerical model, we find that an extremely high MEC of 
carbon would make the optimal ethanol policies positive. 
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                                                     ,R G E G E                                                          (6) 
where ξ denotes relative emissions of ethanol per GEEG. In the numerical part of the paper, we 
assume ξ = 0.8, meaning that one GEEG of ethanol emits 20 percent less CO2 than gasoline. 
Government 
The government employs a volumetric fuel tax t, a proportional tax on labor earnings tL, 
and either a volumetric ethanol blender’s tax credit tc or an ethanol blend mandate θ which 
dictates the minimum share of ethanol in the fuel (ethanol and gasoline) blend. Profits from corn 
production are not taxed. Real government revenue Γ is a fixed lump-sum transfer to consumers, 
and the government’s budget is balanced and satisfies 
                                                L ct L t t ew G e                                                (7) 
The first term on the right-hand side of equation (7) represents government receipts from taxing 
labor; the second term denotes tax revenues from fuel consumption; the final term denotes 
expenditures on the tax credit. 
 Because the real lump-sum transfer Γ is assumed to be fixed, the labor tax is adjusted 
whenever labor supply or gasoline consumption, or ethanol consumption change in response to a 
policy change (i.e., when either the tax credit or the mandate is changed). We hold the fuel tax 
constant when ethanol policies change. 
Equilibrium 
The assumption of perfect substitutability between gasoline and ethanol (on a miles-
traveled basis) implies the following relationship between prices if the tax credit is the only 
binding biofuel policy (de Gorter and Just, 2009a; Cui at al., 2011; Lapan and Moschini, 2012) 
                                              
c
F G E
t t
P P t P
 
                                                (8t)
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Recall that the volume of one GEEG of ethanol is more than one gallon; since the fuel tax and 
ethanol tax credit are both volumetric, adjusting them by γ converts them to $/GEEG units.  
In the situation when the blend mandate θ (in energy terms) determines the ethanol price, 
the fuel price paid by consumers is a weighted average of the ethanol price and gasoline price
8
 
                           1cF E G
t t
P P P t 
 
 
      
 
                                       (8m) 
A key difference between the binding tax credit and the binding blend mandate model is 
how the corn price is determined. With a tax credit, corn prices are directly linked to the gasoline 
price. Combining equations (4) and (8t) and invoking e EP P , we see that the tax credit directly 
affects the corn price: 
                                                  
 1 CC C G c
L
e w
P e P t t
e
                                                     (9) 
 With a binding mandate, corn-market clearing determines the corn price PC, where the 
corn output supply function, denoted by g(PC) in equation (10), equals the sum of consumer 
demand for corn and the corn required for ethanol production (where ethanol production in turn 
depends on fuel demand) 
                                             
 
 
,
,
C
C C
C
F P
g P C P
e



                                             (10) 
The dot in equation (10) denotes all remaining arguments of the corn demand function. Note that 
with either policy in place, corn producer’s profits can be expressed as a function of the corn 
price and the wage rate 
                                       1 ,C C C C C CP g P f g P w P w 
                                       (11) 
where f 
-1 
denotes the inverse of function defined by equation (2).  
                                                          
8
 The blend mandate in energy terms denotes a share of the energy of ethanol in the total energy of the fuel. 
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We close the model by specifying the labor market clearing condition  
                                     
G x C eL L L L L                                                          (12) 
and the representative consumer’s budget constraint
                     
                                     F C x C
P F P C P x N L                                      (13) 
Consumer wealth, on the right-hand side of equation (13), includes (i) the after-tax value of the 
labor endowment, where ω = (1 – tL)w denotes the after-tax wage, (ii) the government transfer, 
and (iii) profits from corn production; all three terms are exogenous from the perspective of the 
consumer. 
III. Marginal Welfare Effects of Biofuel Policies 
 In this section, we present analytical formulas to identify (and later quantify) the marginal 
welfare effects of the biofuel policies. In our welfare effect expressions, we use the term M to 
denote the marginal excess burden of taxation in the labor market, which is defined for a 
marginal change in the labor tax rate as the ratio of the marginal change in the “wedge” 
distortion (numerator) and the marginal change in labor tax revenue (denominator): 
                                                                
L
L
L
L
L
t
t
M
L
L t
t


 



                                                       (14) 
Derivations of the welfare formulas can be found in Appendices 1 to 3. 
Marginal welfare effects of the blender’s tax credit 
The marginal welfare effect of the blender’s tax credit is given by 
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   
 
Primary distortion effect Tax-interaction effect
Revenue-recycling effect
1
1
'
L
S
c C
c c c C C
c
c c c
t t t t
e t
dV de dG L L
M e C
dt dt dt P
de dG dG
M t t
dt dt dt
 




 
    
        
    
 
    
 
Externality effect
c
de
dt

 
 
 
       (15) 
The first component on the right-hand side of equation (15) represents primary 
distortions or “wedges” in the fuel market caused by the fuel tax and the tax credit. It 
corresponds to the deadweight loss associated with the volumetric fuel tax levied on all fuel. 
Because the fuel is a mixture of ethanol and gasoline, the first term, (t - tc) x de/dtc represents the 
part of the change in the primary distortion effect attributable to ethanol while the term t x 
(dG/dtc) represents gasoline’s portion. Note that (t - tc) denotes the net volumetric fuel tax to 
ethanol which is ambiguous in sign and depends on the relative size of the fuel tax and the tax 
credit; this term is negative in our empirical analysis. 
The second component in equation (15), labeled as the tax interaction effect, represents 
the change in the labor supply (i.e., labor tax base) due to a change in the price level in the 
economy. When the prices of consumption goods change, the consumer reallocates the time 
endowment between leisure and labor. Recall that in our model the fuel price under the tax credit 
does not respond to shocks in this policy because it is directly linked to the exogenous gasoline 
price. Moreover, the price of the numeraire is normalized to unity which means that the price 
level in this policy scenario is changed only by the corn price. Labor supply depends on the 
prices of other goods, consumer wealth, and the after-tax wage rate (where the term tL represents 
the wedge between pre-tax and after-tax wages). A change in the corn price due to the tax credit 
directly affects labor supply through the term
CL P  . The corn price change also affects corn 
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production profits, which leads to an indirect income effect on labor supply; this is reflected in 
the term
SC x
CL   , where   /
S
C CC d P dP by Hotelling’s lemma. 
The third component represents the revenue-recycling effect of the tax credit. A change 
in the policy gives rise not only to the primary distortion effect (in the form of a change in the 
deadweight loss due to the fuel tax), but also gives rise to a change in fuel tax revenue. In our 
model, any change in revenue gets recycled in a revenue-neutral manner in the labor market, 
hence the similarity between the primary distortion and the revenue-recycling effects in equation 
(15).
9
 It should be noted that if the tax credit is increased (reduced), it applies to the entire new 
equilibrium quantity of ethanol, not only the incremental amount. This is why the term e is 
present; it represents the initial amount of ethanol in the revenue-recycling component of 
equation (15). 
The last component in equation (15) reflects the externality effect of a change in the tax 
credit. The bracketed term accounts for the change in the total carbon emissions due to a change 
in the tax credit. We assume that one gasoline energy-equivalent gallon of ethanol (adjusted from 
gallons of ethanol by the parameter γ) emits only ξ = 80 percent of carbon emissions relative to 
the same amount of gasoline. This value is close to the central estimate of 0.75 used in Cui et al. 
(2011). The term σ'/λ represents the marginal dollar value of a unit of the externality. 
Marginal welfare effects of a binding blend mandate, holding the tax credit fixed 
 Unlike the blender’s tax credit case, where the ethanol and fuel prices are directly linked 
to the price of gasoline, under the blend mandate both prices are endogenously determined in the 
market equilibrium. This implies additional complexity for the formula (16) that decomposes the 
welfare effects of the blend mandate, as well as for formula (17) that parcels out the effects of 
                                                          
9
 This also applies to equations (16) and (17). 
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the tax credit for a given mandate level. Because not all the welfare effects in equations (16) and 
(17) can be algebraically simplified by decomposing the total fuel into gasoline and ethanol (as 
was the case for the tax credit), we express all the effects in terms of fuel quantity F. 
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The primary distortion effect of the blend mandate in equation (16) can be thought of as 
the sum of three separate effects. First, the mandate by itself acts as an implicit tax on fuel; a 
change in the mandate also changes the effective fuel tax which corresponds to a price 
component of primary distortion represented by the term F E
dP dP
F e
d d

 
 . The second impact of 
increasing the mandate is that the volume of fuel which is taxed to meet a fixed fuel demand in 
GEEGs must be increased, since the energy content of ethanol is lower than that of gasoline; this 
is reflected in the term
1
1t
dF
F
d

 
  
   
  
 . The third impact is a quantity distortion effect, 
represented by ct t
de dF
d d 
  ; it captures the marginal deadweight loss from the tax credit and fuel 
tax which result from ethanol and fuel quantities responding to the policy change. 
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 The tax interaction effect in equation (16) is akin to that in equation (15), with the 
exception that the mandate also affects the fuel price which in turn partially influences labor 
supply via the real wage. The interpretations of the revenue-recycling and externality effects in 
equation (16) are parallel to those for equation (15). 
Marginal welfare effects of the tax credit, holding the binding blend mandate fixed 
 Most countries have had biofuel consumption subsidies combined with binding 
mandates.
10
 As these subsidies can vary over time (e.g., the tax exemption for biodiesel in 
Germany has been gradually reduced), it is important to understand the welfare effects of a 
change in the subsidy coupled with a binding blend mandate. For example, we use equation (17) 
to analyze the effects of allowing the U.S. tax credit to expire, as it has been the case at the end 
of December 2011. 
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                      (17) 
The primary distortion effect in equation (17) follows a similar pattern to that of equation 
(16); the tax credit induces both price distortion effects (reflected by F E
c c
dP dP
F e
dt dt
 ) and 
                                                          
10
 Although the U.S. corn ethanol blender’s tax credit expired on December 31, 2011, many EU countries still use 
tax exemptions. 
18 
 
quantity distortion effects (reflected by
c
c c
t t
t t
de dF
e
d d
 ).  The tax credit also affects the 
distortion between the taxed volume of fuel and consumed GEEGs of fuel, as reflected by the 
term
1
1
ct
dF
t
d


 
 
 
; note that the magnitude of this impact is proportional to the fixed mandate 
level.  It is interesting to note that the tax credit when combined with a binding mandate can 
affect the fuel price, unlike when the tax credit is the binding policy.  Like equation (16), the 
equation (17) tax interaction effect includes the labor supply response to the fuel price as well as 
the corn price, and the remaining two welfare effects in equation (17) have parallel 
interpretations to their equation (15) counterparts.  
IV. Numerical Model 
To estimate and empirically analyze the welfare effects of a change in the U.S. biofuel 
policies, we develop a numerical version of the analytical model presented in Section II and 
calibrate it to the U.S. economy in 2009. 
Consumption 
We assume a nested constant elasticity of substitution (CES) utility function 
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1 1 1
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where αN is a share parameter, δ denotes elasticity of substitution between leisure and the 
composite consumption good, X (i.e., the CES aggregator). The composite good includes fuel, 
corn, and the numeraire good 
 
1 1 1 1
1
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x x x x
x x x
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where σX  is a scale parameter and δx  reflects the elasticity of substitution among fuel, corn, and 
the numeraire good. 
 The consumer maximizes his utility subject to the budget constraint 
F C x X CP F P C P x N L P         
where PX denotes the price index of the composite consumption good and Γ is the real 
government transfer. Derivations of the demand functions and other elements of the numerical 
model can be found in Appendix 4. 
Production 
1. Corn Production 
Corn is produced by a decreasing returns to scale technology of the form SS
CC AL
 ,
 
where A is a scale parameter and  0,1S  . The parameter S implies that the corn supply curve 
is upward sloping; hence, corn producers earn positive profits. Profit maximization implies the 
following labor demand function LC, output supply function C
S
, and profit function πC: 
1 1
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2. Ethanol Production 
The ethanol production function is the same as in the analytical section of the paper, and 
it implies the following cost-minimizing factor demands.  
e
L
e
L
e
 and 
e
C
e
C
e
  
The zero-profit condition for ethanol production establishes the link between corn and ethanol 
prices. 
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3. Gasoline and Fuel Production 
We assume that gasoline is produced by a linear production technology G = BLG, where 
B is a scale factor. Perfect competition and zero profits in the production of gasoline imply PG = 
w/B. Fuel blenders face the gasoline price PG. Price linkages between fuel, gasoline, and ethanol 
under a binding tax credit and blend mandate are given by equations (8t) and (8m), respectively. 
4. Numeraire Production 
 The numeraire good is produced by a linear technology x = kLx, where k is a scaling 
constant. Perfect competition and zero profits imply Px = w/k. 
Government 
The government’s real lump-sum transfer to the consumer is fixed at Γ, and the 
governmental budget constraint is given by 
   1X L cP t w L N t F e t e          
where PX denotes the price deflator on consumption. 
Equilibrium 
For any policy choice, the labor market must clear according to 
      G x c eL L L L L N       
V. Data and Calibration 
We now calibrate the closed-economy general equilibrium numerical model from Section 
IV to reflect the realities of the U.S. economy in 2009. The observed data and parameter 
assumptions used in our calibration can be found in Appendix 6- Table A1, together with their 
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sources. To consistently model the relationships in the fuel market, all prices and quantities are 
expressed in gasoline energy-equivalent gallons. 
Because both the blender’s tax credit and a blend mandate were in place in 2009, it is 
important to determine which policy established the ethanol market price. We follow the 
reasoning presented in de Gorter and Just (2010b) and calibrate the model to a binding blend 
mandate. We calculate the ethanol blend mandate as the share of ethanol consumed in the United 
States and the total U.S. fuel consumption; this gives the mandate of θ = 0.06. The ethanol 
blender’s tax credit of $0.498/gallon consists of the federal part of $0.45/gallon and the average 
of state tax credits of $0.048 (Koplow 2009). 
We assume that the Unites States faces a perfectly elastic supply of gasoline; hence, the 
gasoline price, PG = $1.76/gallon, is exogenous in our model. The observed ethanol market price 
of $1.79/gallon corresponds to $2.56/GEEG, reflecting lower mileage of ethanol relative to 
gasoline. The final fuel price, PF = $2.27/GEEG, is equal to the weighted average of the ethanol 
and gasoline market prices adjusted for the fuel tax ($0.49/gallon) and the tax credit; the weights 
represent the (energy-equivalent) shares of ethanol and gasoline, respectively, in the fuel blend. 
In calculating the fuel price, we recognize that both the fuel tax and the blend mandate are 
volumetric which requires adjusting the levels of these policies for the energy content of ethanol, 
hence the γ term in the equation defining PF in Table A1. 
We follow Ballard (2000) in determining the ‘time endowment’ ratio (i.e., labor 
endowment divided by labor supply), Φ, that makes our model yield estimates of the income 
elasticity and uncompensated elasticity of labor supply which are consistent with those found in 
the literature. Data from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis indicate that the share of labor in 
the U.S. GDP was 0.57 in 2009. Normalizing the wage rate to unity, the previous ratio then 
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determines the number of hours of labor. The total time endowment is in turn calculated by 
multiplying the parameter Φ by the number of hours spent working. The leisure demand is 
computed as the residual between the total time endowment and labor. Following the literature 
(e.g., Goulder et al. 1999; Parry 2011), we assume the (ad valorem) U.S. labor tax to be 40 
percent. Following the Ballard procedure and using parameter and variable values detailed in 
Table A1, we arrive at Φ = 1.19, which is close to Ballard’s estimate of 1.21. Full details about 
our use of Ballard’s procedure can be found in Appendix 5. 
In our model, the representative consumer’s decisions can be thought of as occurring in 
two stages. First, based on exogenous wealth and market prices he decides how much leisure and 
composite good to consume. Recall that the composite good is an aggregator of fuel, corn, and 
the numeraire good which proxies for everything else. The price of the composite good thus 
serves as a price index for the economy. Second, the quantity of the composite good from the 
first stage is allocated optimally between fuel, corn, and the numeraire. We normalize the price 
of the numeraire to unity. By setting the price of the composite good to unity in the baseline 
(though it varies in the simulations), we assume a unitary real wage rate equal to the nominal 
wage in the baseline. 
We choose the elasticity of substitution among consumption goods to be 0.3 which 
results in own price elasticities of demand for fuel and corn to be -0.289 and -0.299, respectively. 
Our fuel demand elasticity is close to that reported by Hamilton (2009) (-0.26) and also to the 
long-run elasticity reported by a recent meta-analysis by Havránek et al. (2012). The corn 
demand elasticity is close to that used by de Gorter and Just (2009a) and Cui et al. (2011). 
To evaluate the effect of ethanol policies on the consumer’s welfare from the 
environmental externality of CO2, we assume that ethanol emits 20 percent less carbon emissions 
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relative to gasoline, in line with de Gorter and Just (2010b). We assume that the marginal 
external cost of CO2 emissions is $0.06/GEEG (Parry and Small 2005). 
VI. Results 
Using the calibrated model above, we first determine the optimal blender’s tax credit and 
mandate (individually) by maximizing the social welfare (representative consumer’s utility). 
Unlike other studies (e.g., Khanna 2008, Cui et al. 2011), we find that both policies should be set 
to zero at the optimum. The most important factor contributing to this result is the presence of 
‘water’ in the biofuel policy price premium and associated rectangular deadweight costs 
(RDC).
11
 The following sub-section explains and quantifies this welfare cost. 
‘Water’ in the Biofuel Policy Price Premium12 
The ethanol industry competes for corn with other industries that use the feedstock for 
feed/food purposes. In our model, the amount of corn available for ethanol is given by the 
difference between corn supply and the non-ethanol corn demand at any corn market price. Thus, 
the intercept of the ethanol supply coincides, after a unit adjustment, with the equilibrium corn 
price when no ethanol is produced.
13 
Denoting this threshold price (intercept of the ethanol 
supply curve) as PNE, from our simulations we obtain PNE = $2.07/GEEG. The ‘no policy’ 
ethanol price, PE
*
, denotes a market price of ethanol assuming no biofuel policy (i.e., a tax credit 
or mandate) in place.
14
 Our model shows that without 2009 biofuel policies, no ethanol would be 
                                                          
11
 For example, Cui et al. (2011) calibrate their model to a tax credit which in their case necessitates adjusting the 
observed gasoline price up by $0.32/gallon. This results in no ‘water’ in their model. Moreover, we note that non-
linear demand/supply curves, as it is the case in our model, make the presence of ‘water’ more likely. 
12
 Explanation of ‘water’ in biofuel policy price premium and related concepts can be found in greater detail in 
Drabik (2011). 
13
 In a partial equilibrium framework, this point is given by the intersection of the corn supply curve and the non-
ethanol demand curve. 
14
 Note that assuming no ethanol production is not synonymous to assuming no biofuel policy. While the former, by 
definition, implies zero ethanol production, the latter may result in positive ethanol production. Drabik (2011) shows 
that ethanol production could occur even in the absence of biofuel policies, provided that consumers are able to 
choose between ethanol and gasoline, and the oil price is sufficiently high and/or the fuel tax is sufficiently low. 
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produced in 2009: the ‘no policy’ ethanol price PE
*
 = $1.55/GEEG is below the intercept of the 
ethanol supply curve.
15
  
The gap between the intercept of the ethanol supply curve and the ‘no policy’ ethanol 
price represents ‘water’ in the biofuel price premium (de Gorter and Just 2008; Drabik 2011), 
and, in our case, is equal to $2.07/GEEG - $1.55/GEEG = $0.52/GEEG.
16
 It can be thought of as 
representing the waste of societal resources because gasoline is less costly and yet production of 
more costly ethanol is incentivized through biofuel policies. The estimated ‘water’ represents 
more than a fifth of the observed market price of ethanol in 2009. This is one of the reasons why 
both the optimal tax credit and the blend mandate are found to be zero in 2009 – the prevailing 
market conditions made it very inefficient to produce ethanol from corn.
17
 Notice also that our 
(general equilibrium) estimate of ‘water’ in the biofuel policy price premium is similar to the 
partial equilibrium estimate of $0.76/GEEG reported by Drabik (2011).
18
 This indicates that the 
presence of ‘water’ in the biofuel policy price premium is not due only to our model 
specification. Quantifying the RDC associated with the status quo ethanol production entails 
multiplying the level of ‘water’ by the amount of ethanol produced. In 2009, we find the RDC is 
$4 billion (= $0.52/GEEG x 7.73 billion GEEGs).
19
 In sum, for any optimal biofuel policy to 
induce positive ethanol production, the ethanol price premium would have to exceed the ‘water’.  
                                                          
15
 This price is calculated using equation (8t) and assuming a zero tax credit. 
16
 The ethanol price premium is equal to the difference between the observed ethanol price and the ‘no policy’ 
ethanol price. 
17
 In contrast, Cui et al. (2011) find that there would be ethanol production even in the absence of the mandate and 
tax credit in 2009. The difference arises because their linear partial equilibrium model is calibrated assuming the tax 
credit is the binding policy, while we calibrate the model to a binding blend mandate coupled with a tax credit (see 
our reasoning in Section 5). The presence of ‘water’ is also determined by the curvature of the supply and demand 
curves; the non-linear relationships in our model make ‘water’ more likely, other things being equal. 
18
 That our estimate of water is lower than that in Drabik (2011) is consistent with the empirical observation that 
general equilibrium effects tend to be smaller relative to those obtained from a partial equilibrium analysis. 
19
 7.73 billion GEEGs correspond to 11.038 billion gallons of ethanol in the first column in Table A2. 
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To measure the welfare effects of the biofuel policies, we analyze three policy 
simulations: the status quo scenario (i.e., a binding blend mandate coupled with a tax credit); a 
scenario where the blend mandate is held at its status quo level but the tax credit is removed (the 
removal of the tax credit in this scenario mimics the policy change that occurred in January 2012 
when the U.S. ethanol blender’s tax credit expired but the corn ethanol mandate under the 
Renewable Fuel Standard remained in place); and a scenario with no ethanol policies. The results 
of these policy simulations are shown in Table A2 in Appendix 6. 
Welfare Effects of the Tax Credit with a Binding Mandate 
 In the status quo scenario, ethanol production is determined by a binding blend mandate 
of 5.88 percent combined with a blender’s tax credit of $0.498/gallon. Table 1 decomposes the 
total welfare change from the tax credit removal into the four components identified in Section 
II: the primary distortion effect, tax interaction effect, revenue recycling effect, and externality 
effect. The welfare effects presented in Table 1 correspond to a policy change from the status 
quo to the “tax credit removed” scenario in Table A2.  
  
The primary distortion effect (due to the fuel tax and tax credit) in the fuel market is 
estimated to be a loss of $328 million. To better understand its origin, consider Figure 1 where 
PG denotes the exogenous gasoline market price, and PG +t is the consumer price of fuel 
Welfare Component Welfare Change ($ billion)
Primary Distortion -0.328
Tax Interaction Effect -0.063
Revenue Recycling Effect 0.360
Externality Effect 0.040
Total Change in Welfare 0.009
Source: calculated
Table 1. Welfare Effects of Removing the Tax Credit but Keeping the Mandate
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(gasoline) under no biofuel policies. The Harberger deadweight loss triangle associated with the 
fuel tax t is area abc. The fuel (ethanol and gasoline) price under a blend mandate θ alone (i.e., 
absent of the fuel tax and tax credit) is denoted by PF (θ). When a tax credit tc and a fuel tax t are 
added to the blend mandate, the fuel price increases to PF (θ, tc, t); the effective fuel tax is thus 
equal to PF (θ, tc, t) – PF (θ), corresponding to distance fd in Figure 1. The distortion associated 
with this fuel tax is therefore triangle def. 
Because a mandate per se works as an implicit fuel tax (de Gorter and Just 2010b; Lapan 
and Moschini 2012), before being removed the tax credit was suppressing the full effect of the 
implicit tax by lowering the price of the fuel blend.
20
 The elimination of the tax credit increases 
the fuel price to PF (θ, t), thus increasing the distortion in the fuel market to be area geh. The 
trapezoid gdfh then represents the primary distortion effect of removing the blender’s tax 
credit.
21
 
The fuel price increase lowers the real wage and causes the representative consumer to 
substitute leisure for consumption goods, thus shifting the labor supply curve to the left.
22
 The 
contraction of the labor tax base results in a welfare loss due to the tax interaction effect of $63 
million. 
When the blender’s tax credit is abandoned, the government revenue from the fuel tax 
decreases by $349 million (see Table A2). However, the government saves $5.5 billion by no 
longer having to pay for the tax credit, so the overall revenue from the fuel market increases by 
$5.15 billion. This additional revenue is “recycled” – the labor tax rate can be reduced while the 
                                                          
20
 de Gorter and Just (2009a) show that the tax credit in combination with a binding mandate acts as a fuel 
consumption subsidy. Similarly, Drabik (2011) and Lapan and Moschini (2012) show that for a given blend 
mandate, an increase in the blender’s tax credit decreases the fuel price, but increases the gasoline price. 
21
 The tax credit does not cause any primary distortion in the corn market because corn is not taxed in our model. 
22
 Although the corn price decreases by $0.007/bushel, this effect is more than offset by an increase in the fuel price 
by $0.041/GEEG such that the overall price index rises from 1 to 1.001. 
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real government transfer is held constant. The revenue-recycling effect of alleviating the pre-
existing distortion in the labor market yields a benefit of $360 million. 
 The last welfare component in Table 1 is the positive externality effect of $40 million.  
This benefit is due to a decrease in fuel consumption of 710 million gallons (Table A2), caused 
by the elimination of the tax credit. 
 In total, we estimate that removing the tax credit improves social welfare by $9 million. 
This result is consistent with earlier findings from partial equilibrium models (e.g., de Gorter and 
Just 2010b), although the magnitude of the total welfare effect is perhaps smaller than a partial 
equilibrium model would predict. The welfare improvement is rather small because the tax 
credit’s removal causes a significant increase in the primary distortion in the fuel market. 
The main result from Table 1 is that the removal of the tax credit (while keeping the 
mandate) costs $63 million (the tax interaction effect) but there is a much bigger welfare gain 
due to the revenue recycling effect of $360 million. This means the net fiscal interaction welfare 
effect is large compared to the total welfare gains and is approximately equal to the welfare loss 
of the primary distortion effects. 
In standard models of environmental taxation, the revenue recycling effect only exceeds 
the tax interaction effect in magnitude if the taxed good is a relatively weak substitute for leisure 
(Parry 1995). The nested-CES functional form for utility in our model imposes that all goods are 
equal (and hence all average) substitutes for leisure, so our finding that the revenue recycling 
effect exceeds the tax interaction effect in magnitude is perhaps surprising. However, since the 
tax credit was imposed on top of a binding mandate in this model, the standard model prediction 
does not necessarily apply and the relative size of the two fiscal interaction effects was a priori 
indeterminate. 
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The results presented in Table A2 also provide interesting insights into how biofuel 
policies affect the fuel tax revenue. To see this, consider the addition of the tax credit to a blend 
mandate (the second versus the first column in Table A2). The increase in the tax revenue from 
$65.7 billion (= 130.04 x 0.49) to $66.1 billion (= 134.75 x 0.49) is only due to higher fuel 
consumption. This means one gasoline energy-equivalent gallon of ethanol replaces less than one 
gallon of gasoline; thus, leakage of a biofuel policy in the fuel market is a condition for higher 
tax revenues. 
To further analyze the role of the fiscal interaction effects in the welfare change due to 
the tax credit removal, we set the labor tax to zero (thus eliminating the fiscal interaction effects) 
and recalculate the primary distortion and externality effects (results not reported in a table). The 
primary distortion and externality effects are similar to those reported in Table 1—a loss of $355 
million and a gain of $44 million, respectively. Owing to the absence of the fiscal interaction 
effects, however, the elimination of the tax credit results in a welfare loss of $311 million. This 
indicates that when the labor tax cannot be adjusted in response to a change in the net fuel tax 
revenue and when the real government transfer is not held constant, adding a tax credit to a 
binding mandate may indeed be welfare improving. In this case, the welfare improvement occurs 
only due to higher fuel tax revenue which is transferred lump sum to the representative 
consumer.
23
 Because the ethanol price is determined by the mandate, the addition of the tax 
credit has only a marginal effect on ethanol consumption, and (mostly) gasoline consumption is 
subsidized instead. This gives rise to higher fuel tax revenues. 
Welfare Effects of Blend Mandate Removal 
                                                          
23
 This is analogous to Cui et al. (2011) where the status quo versus a tax credit results in significant welfare gains 
due to increased tax revenues. 
29 
 
We now quantify how welfare would change if the status quo blend mandate were 
removed, and no tax credit was in place. This is the welfare effect of a change from the second 
scenario in Table A2 (Tax Credit Removed) to the third scenario (No Ethanol Policy). We 
anticipate that removing the mandate will cause welfare gains since we find that the optimal 
blend mandate is zero. Table 2 presents our estimates of the total welfare effect as well as its 
components. The last row of Table 2 does indeed confirm that overall welfare improves by $8.28 
billion when the mandate is removed. 
  
The primary distortion effect is the most significant component (about 85 percent) of the 
total welfare change. This reflects in large part the elimination of the RDC due to ‘water’ in the 
ethanol price premium ($4 billion). Welfare gains also arise because eliminating the mandate 
decreases both price and quantity distortions. The fuel price decreases from $2.31/GEEG to 
$2.25/GEEG, and the amount of fuel in energy-equivalent terms increases by 1.10 billion 
GEEGs (Table A2). In Figure 1, this is depicted as the transition from area geh to area abc, 
yielding a welfare gain (i.e., reduction in the distortion) equal to the difference between the two 
triangles. 
Welfare Component Welfare Change ($ billion)
Primary Distortion 6.974
Tax Interaction Effect 1.544
Revenue Recycling Effect -0.063
Externality Effect -0.173
Total Change in Welfare 8.282
Source: calculated
Table 2. Welfare Effects of Removing the Mandate after Tax Credit is Removed
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The decrease in the fuel and corn prices after the mandate is removed increases the real 
wage; this shifts the labor supply curve to the right, as depicted in panel (a) of Figure 2.
24
 
Keeping the labor tax rate at its original level tL
0
, rectangle lopm represents a positive tax 
interaction effect that we estimate to be $1.54 billion (17 percent of the total welfare change). 
This effect is positive because the mandate removal causes an expansion of the labor tax base. 
Although the quantity of fuel in energy terms increases, its volume measured in gallons 
actually decreases. This happens because in the absence of the mandate, no ethanol is consumed 
and the fuel consists exclusively of gasoline. Because gasoline has lower volume than the same 
energy-equivalent of ethanol, the total volume of fuel decreases. This decrease results in a 
reduction in the fuel tax revenue because the fuel tax is levied on a volumetric basis. In order to 
be able to depict this situation in panel (b) of Figure 2, we have to convert the volumetric fuel tax 
into its energy-equivalent. Denoting tF as the common energy-based fuel tax for ethanol and 
gasoline, it has to satisfy  Ft F t E tG  , from which    1Ft t t     , where F, E, and 
G, where F = E + G, denote quantities of fuel, ethanol, and gasoline, respectively, and /E F 
denotes the blend mandate. 
The initial fuel tax revenue in panel (b) of Figure 2 corresponds to the rectangle abcd. 
(Price PF0 represents a fuel price in the absence of the fuel tax t). When the mandate is removed, 
the consumer price of fuel falls to PG + t, earning tax revenue of area efgh (area efgh is smaller 
than area abcd). The loss of fuel tax revenue must be compensated by increasing the labor tax to 
keep the real government transfer to consumers constant. This is depicted in panel (a) of Figure 
2, where the increase in the labor tax corresponds to a lower after tax wage w – tL
1
 (holding the 
                                                          
24
 SL(PF1) denotes labor supply curve when the price of fuel is PF1 (i.e., with the mandate), and SL(PG + t) denotes the 
labor supply curve after the mandate has been abandoned. Demand for labor is assumed to be perfectly elastic in 
Figure 2. 
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labor supply curve at its original position). This yields labor tax revenue equal to area qrsn which 
must be larger than the original revenue of klmn. The positive difference between these two areas 
offsets the revenue loss in the fuel market. Because the labor market distortion has increased, the 
revenue recycling effect is equal to -$63 million. The amount of labor L1 is only hypothetical, 
however, because it assumes no tax-interaction effect (in reality, these effects happen 
simultaneously). 
Our simulation shows that the final labor tax rate decreases from 0.3996 to 0.3983, and 
labor tax revenue also decreases. In panel (a), this is depicted as a shift up of the after-tax wage: 
from w – tL
0
 to w – tL
2
. This happens because the tax interaction effect outweighs the revenue 
recycling effect. The final labor tax revenue is represented by area tuvn, which must be smaller 
than area klmn. Note also that because the real wage rate increases, the demand for fuel (and corn 
for non-ethanol use) increases, which is depicted by the demand curve DF(w – tL
2
) in panel (b). 
The final labor tax tL
2
 solves: 0 20 0 2 2F L Lt F t L tG t L   . 
Eliminating the mandate yields a welfare loss of $173 million from the externality effect.  
The welfare losses arise from two sources: the share of the dirtier fuel (gasoline) in the blend 
increases, and fuel demand increases due to the fuel price decrease. 
The main result from Table 2 is that the tax interaction effect of removing the mandate 
results in a welfare gain of $1.54 billion which is partially offset by a welfare loss of $63 million 
due to the revenue recycling effect. This means the net fiscal interaction welfare effect is again 
significant in magnitude, although the magnitude is not large relative to the primary distortion or 
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total welfare gain.
25
 The net welfare gain associated with the abolition of the blend mandate is 
largely due to elimination of the RDC worth $4 billion. 
Welfare Comparison of a Tax Credit and a Mandate 
This section is motivated by a recent literature which shows that in a partial equilibrium 
framework an optimal biofuel (consumption) mandate is welfare superior to an optimal tax credit 
not only with a suboptimal fuel tax (de Gorter and Just 2010b), but also without it (Lapan and 
Moschini, 2012). Because in our model both optimal policies are zero (due to RDC), we do not 
perform a general equilibrium welfare comparison analogous to the above studies. Instead, we 
fix the blend mandate at its status quo level (5.88 percent) and calculate a tax credit that by itself 
would generate an equivalent quantity of ethanol. We then study the welfare effects of removing 
both policies. To see how the presence of the fuel and labor taxes affects the welfare outcome, 
we consider three cases summarized in Table 3: (i) both taxes exist, (ii) fuel tax only and (iii) 
labor tax only. 
 
Consider first the case where both the fuel and labor taxes are present, and the ethanol 
quantity under the mandate and tax credit alone is 10.98 billion gallons (Table A3). When each 
                                                          
25
 Compare this net fiscal interaction gain of $0.91 billion (= 1.54-0.63) with the welfare loss of $7.13 billion due to 
deterioration of the terms of trade in oil imports and corn exports implied for the removal of the binding tax credit in 
Cui et al. (2011). 
Table 3. Welfare Effects of Removing Status Quo Mandate vs. an Equivalent Tax Credit
Pre-Existing Distortion Scenario Mandate Tax credit
Fuel tax and labor tax 7.096 6.607
Fuel tax* 6.296 5.693
Labor tax 7.227 7.269
* The value of the government transfer is allowed to freely adjust in these simulations
Source: calculated
Welfare change ($ billion)
33 
 
policy is eliminated, ethanol production in both cases falls to zero because the existing ‘water’ 
prevents any ethanol production without a biofuel policy. Although the decrease in ethanol 
production is the same for both policies (10.98 billion gallons), the removal of the mandate 
yields a greater total welfare gain ($7.096 billion) than the removal of the tax credit ($6.607 
billion). Alternatively, these welfare changes can be interpreted as follows: the introduction of a 
biofuel mandate reduces welfare by $7.1 billion, while the introduction of the same quantity of 
ethanol through a tax credit reduces welfare by only $6.6 billion. This implies the tax credit is 
welfare superior to the mandate. But this result needs to be interpreted cautiously. 
Because we do not compare optimal policy levels, our finding does not violate the 
theoretical conclusion of Lapan and Moschini (2012) about the superiority of the mandate. But 
even when the tax credit and the mandate are compared for the same level of ethanol production, 
de Gorter and Just (2010b) show theoretically that the mandate welfare dominates the tax credit 
and more so if both policies are coupled with a suboptimal fuel tax. However, the results 
presented in the first set of columns in Table 3 are clearly not in line with this prediction.  
The explanation is quite simple and intuitive: our fuel tax of $0.49/gallon is not 
suboptimal (i.e., less than the external cost of the externality of $0.06/gallon reported in Table 
A1), but it is superoptimal, meaning higher than the marginal external cost.
26
 Because the 
mandate by itself acts as an implicit tax on fuel consumption (in the form of a higher fuel price), 
the addition of a superoptimal fuel tax makes it even more distortionary. On the other hand, 
because the tax credit lowers the fuel price, it works in the opposite direction and brings the 
effective fuel tax closer to its optimal level. 
                                                          
26
 Like us, Cui et al. (2011) also consider only one externality – carbon (CO2) emissions. They assume a marginal 
emissions damage of $20/tCO2. Parry et al. (2007) assume the marginal external damage due to carbon emissions to 
be $25/tCO2, which corresponds to $0.06/gallon. Therefore, the marginal emissions damage of $20/tCO2 in Cui et 
al. (2011) translates into $0.048/gallon which is less than the fuel tax of $0.39/gallon they use. Hence, their fuel tax 
is superoptimal. 
34 
 
This explanation also holds for the case when only the fuel tax is present, as seen in the 
second row of Table 3. However, as shown in the third row, the mandate becomes superior to a 
tax credit in the absence of the fuel tax (with only the labor tax in place). This is consistent with 
the explanation above as well as the prediction of de Gorter and Just (2010b) because the (zero) 
fuel tax is suboptimal. In this scenario, when the mandate implicitly taxes gasoline consumption 
to pay for higher ethanol prices, it is beneficially compensating for the suboptimal fuel tax. 
To test the impact of RDC on the results in Table 3, we artificially increase the gasoline 
price (to $2.41/gallon) such that ‘water’ in the ethanol price premium is eliminated. The welfare 
gains from removing the policies given this assumption are reported in Table 4. The welfare 
gains are significantly smaller than their counterparts in Table 3, largely because the RDC of $4 
billion is now absent. However, the results in Table 4 are qualitatively unchanged from Table 3, 
so we conclude that the presence of ‘water’ has no qualitative impact on the welfare superiority 
of a tax credit over a mandate (for the same ethanol production) under a superoptimal fuel tax. 
 
 The central message of the analysis above is that in countries which have a superoptimal 
fuel tax, like Great Britain (Parry and Small 2005), a tax credit will be welfare superior to a 
mandate when comparison is made for the same ethanol production. 
 
Pre-Existing Distortion Scenario Mandate Tax credit
Fuel tax and labor tax 1.507 1.381
Fuel tax* 0.506 0.300
Labor tax 1.035 1.045
* The value of the government transfer is allowed to freely adjust in these simulations
Source: calculated
Welfare change ($ billion)
Table 4. Welfare Effects of Removing Status Quo Mandate vs. an Equivalent Tax 
Credit: the 'No Water' Case
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VII. Conclusion 
 Although several earlier works have studied the welfare effects of the U.S. biofuel 
policies, the analyses have primarily been done in a partial equilibrium framework. These 
models are thus unable to capture general equilibrium fiscal interaction effects of biofuel 
policies. In this paper, we build a tractable general equilibrium model of the U.S. economy to 
analyze the welfare effects of a change in (or a complete removal of) the U.S. biofuel policies, a 
tax credit and a blend mandate. More specifically, we assume the government keeps the real 
transfer to consumers fixed and adjusts the labor tax whenever a change in a biofuel policy 
occurs. This enables us to study two interactions of biofuel policies with the broader fiscal 
system. 
First, the tax interaction effect arises when the price of corn or fuel increases (decreases) 
as a result of a biofuel policy change, making the real wage decrease (increase) and thus 
contracting (expanding) the labor supply curve . The ensuing loss (gain) in labor tax revenue – 
holding the labor tax constant – represents the tax interaction effect. Second, a change in the 
biofuel policy affects the government fuel tax receipts. If the biofuel policy change yields greater 
(lesser) fuel tax revenue, this additional revenue is used to reduce (increase) the pre-existing 
labor tax to keep the real transfer to the consumer fixed; depending on the change in the labor 
tax, the pre-existing distortion in the labor market can either increase or decrease. The direction 
of the net fiscal interaction effect depends on the direction and magnitude of its tax interaction 
and revenue recycling components. 
 To mirror the recent expiration of the U.S. corn-ethanol tax credit, we simulate the 
welfare effects of removing the tax credit, keeping the blend mandate unchanged. Eliminating 
the tax credit yields a small gain in total welfare of $9 billion, but the fiscal interaction effects 
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are more pronounced. Because the fuel price increases when the tax credit is removed, the tax 
interaction effect is estimated to be a loss of $63 million. But because the fiscal savings due to 
the absence of the tax credit can be used to reduce the labor tax, the revenue recycling effect of 
this policy change is a welfare gain of $360 billion. This implies that the net fiscal interaction 
welfare effect is large compared to the total welfare change, and it is approximately equal to the 
welfare loss of the primary distortion effect. 
 Motivated by our finding that the optimal mandate (as well as the tax credit) is zero, we 
analyze the welfare effects of the elimination of the status quo mandate. We indeed find that the 
current blend mandate is not optimal as its abandonment results in a total welfare gain of more 
than $8 billion. Significant welfare gains come from the elimination of the RDC (estimated to be 
$4 billion), as well as from a positive tax interaction effect of $1.54 billion. However, the welfare 
gains from the tax interaction effect are partially offset by a loss of $63 million due to the 
revenue recycling effect. In sum, the net fiscal interaction welfare effect of removing the 
mandate is significant in magnitude, although the magnitude is smaller relative to the primary 
distortion or total welfare gain. 
For the same ethanol production, a blender’s tax credit is empirically found to be welfare 
superior to a mandate. This ordering is found to hold regardless of the presence of ‘water’ in the 
ethanol price premium (i.e., the gap between the free market ethanol price and the intercept of 
the ethanol supply curve). This is a novel result, since previous literature has concluded that, 
given the same ethanol production, a mandate always welfare dominates the tax credit. This 
finding is driven by the fact that the fuel tax is superoptimal in our model (i.e., it exceeds the 
marginal external cost of gasoline consumption). The superoptimality of the fuel tax in our 
model reflects the exclusion of vehicle-miles-traveled externalities such as traffic accidents or 
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congestion. The implication of our results is that the biofuel mandate is likely to be inferior to a 
blender’s tax credit (or a tax exemption) in countries that have superoptimal fuel tax, such as the 
United Kingdom (Parry and Small 2005). 
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Figure 1. The Primary Distortion Effects in the Fuel Market 
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Figure 2. Fiscal Interaction Effects of 
Removing a Blend Mandate
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Appendix 1: Derivation of the Marginal Welfare Effects of the Tax Credit 
The optimal tax credit solves: 
        
, , ,
max , , , max , , ,
c
C C C F C x
t F C x L
V R P u F C x L L R L P F P C P x                 
subject to:    
                                                                1R F e                                                         (A1.1) 
                                                                    C C CP                                                          (A1.2) 
                                                                    1 Lw t                                                           (A1.3) 
                                                   1 CC C G c
L
e w
P e P t t
e
                                               (A1.4) 
                                                      1L ct L t tw F e e                                                (A1.5) 
To simplify further computations, we normalize the wage rate to unity, that is, w =1. Totally 
differentiating the indirect utility function with respect to tc, we obtain: 
                                      0C C
c c C c c C c
dV V dR V d V d V dP
dt R dt dt dt P dt
 
 
   
    
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                           (A1.6) 
where the partial derivatives come from the objective function, 
                                            '; ; ;
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 
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   
                                  (A1.7) 
and the total derivatives are obtained from constraints (A1.1–4) 
                       1 ; ' ; ;SC C L CC C C
c c c c c c c c
dR dF de d dP d dt dP
C e e
dt dt dt dt dt dt dt dt
 
                      (A1.8) 
where use has been made of Hotelling’s lemma, that is, ' SC C Cd dP C   . 
 Associated with a change in the tax credit is a change in the labor tax such that the real 
government transfer Γ is constant. To see how the labor tax changes in response to a marginal 
change in the tax credit, we totally differentiate constraint (A1.5) with respect to tc to obtain 
                                         1 0L L c
c c c c c
dt dL
L t t t t
dF de de
e
dt dt dt dt dt
                                  (A1.9) 
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Because we are interested in the effects of the tax credit on the labor market, we need to 
determine cdL dt . To do that, we totally differentiate the labor supply function (the mirror image 
of the consumer’s demand for leisure) with respect to tc, to obtain
27
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                                    (A1.10) 
Substituting the total derivative (A1.10) into (A1.9) and collecting the terms, we arrive at  
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                 (A1.11) 
 An increase in the labor tax distorts the labor market. The distortion is measured by the 
marginal excess burden of taxation M defined as the ratio of the increase in the “wedge” 
distortion (numerator) and the increase in labor tax revenue for a marginal change in the labor 
tax (denominator). Mathematically,
28
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                                                     (A1.12) 
By rearranging equation (A1.12), the effect of a change in the nominal labor tax on the 
labor supply can be expressed as 
                                                                
 1L L
L ML
t M t

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 
                                                  (A1.13) 
 Alternatively, this effect can be written as 
                                                          
27
 Although the labor supply L depends on ω, Γ, πC, PF, PC, and Px, a change in the tax credit only affects the labor 
supply through ω, πC, PC. 
28
 Note that because L is measured in hours spent working, each term in equation (A1.12) should be multiplied by 
the wage rate w to convert the numerator and denominator into dollars terms. The term w cancels out, however, 
resulting in equation (A1.12). 
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Combining equations (A1.13) and (A1.14) and using the fact that Ld dt w   (this follows from 
equation (A1.3)) yields 
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                                                   (A1.15) 
The derivative (A1.15) describes the response of labor supply to a marginal change in the real 
wage rate. Substitution of this derivative into equation (A1.11) and rearrangement produce 
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 The final optimality condition is obtained by substituting the derivatives (A1.7), (A1.8), 
and (A1.16) into equation (A1.6) and collecting the terms:     
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Appendix 2: Derivation of the Marginal Welfare Effects of the Blend Mandate 
  
The optimal mandate solves: 
        
, , ,
max , , , , max , , ,C C F C F C x
F C x L
V R P P u F C x L L R L P F P C P x

                  
subject to:   
 
                                                                1R F e                                                         (A2.1) 
                                                                    C C CP                                                          (A2.2) 
                                                                    1 Lw t                                                           (A2.3) 
                                                               CC C E
L
we
P e P
e
                                                       (A2.4) 
                                                  1cF E G
t t
P P P t 
 
 
      
 
                                    (A2.5) 
                                                      1L ct L t tw F e e                                                (A2.6) 
                                                                  SCe e C C                                                        (A2.7) 
                                                                       e F                                                              (A2.8) 
 
Note that under the binding blend mandate, the quantities of ethanol and fuel are linked one-to-
one as indicated by equation (A2.8).
29
 After substituting equations (A2.7) and (A2.8) into 
equations (A2.1), (A2.6), we obtain: 
                                                                1R F e                                                      (A2.1') 
                                                    
1
1 1
L ct L t tw F e

   
  
   
  
                                       (A2.6') 
 We normalize the wage rate to unity, w =1. Totally differentiating the indirect utility 
function with respect to θ yields: 
                                C C F
C C F
dV V dR V d V d V dP V dP
d R d d d P d P d
 
       
    
    
    
                      (A2.9) 
where the partial derivatives come from the objective function, 
                                                          
29
 Under the tax credit and exogenous gasoline price (which we assume), the quantities of ethanol and fuel are 
delinked, however. 
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                                   '; ; ; ;
c C F
V V V V V
L C F
R P P
    
 
    
       
    
                      (A2.10) 
and the total derivatives are obtained from constraints (A2.1') and  (A2.2–4) 
                         1 ; ; ;SC C L C EC
dR dF de d dP d dt dP dP
C e
d d d d d d d d d
 
  
        
                 (A2.11) 
 Totally differentiating equation (A2.6') with respect to θ, we obtain 
                                 
1 1
1 1 1L
L c
dt dL
L t t t t
dF de
F
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
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    
                     (A2.12) 
where the effect of a change in the blend mandate on the labor supply in the economy can be 
decomposed, similarly to equation (A1.10) in Appendix, as follows: 
                                     
SL C C F
C C F
dL L dt L dP L dP L dP
C
d d P d d P d      
   
    
   
                        (A2.13) 
Substituting equation (A2.13) into (A2.12), invoking equation (A1.15), and rearranging, we get
 
                
1 1
1 1 1
1
L L
L
S C F
c
C C F
t t t t t
dt
L L dP L dP dF de
C F
P d P d d d
M
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
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        
           
           (A2.14) 
Finally, the optimality condition for a blend mandate is derived by substituting the 
derivatives (A2.10), (A2.11), and (A2.14) into equation (A2.9) and collecting the terms 
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            (A2.15) 
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Appendix 3: Derivation of the Marginal Welfare Effects of the Tax Credit with a Binding 
Blend Mandate 
 
The tax credit solves: 
        
, , ,
max , , , , max , , ,
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C C F C F C x
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V R P P u F C x L L R L P F P C P x                  
subject to:   
 
                                                                1R F e                                                         (A3.1) 
                                                                    C C CP                                                          (A3.2) 
                                                                    1 Lw t                                                           (A3.3) 
                                                               CC C E
L
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                                                       (A3.4) 
                                                  1cF E G
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 
 
      
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                                    (A3.5) 
                                                      1L ct L t tw F e e                                                (A3.6) 
                                                                  SCe e C C                                                        (A3.7) 
                                                                       e F                                                              (A3.8) 
 
After substituting equations (A3.7) and (A3.8) into equations (A3.1), (A3.6), we obtain: 
                                                                1R F e                                                       (A3.1') 
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  
   
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                                       (A3.6') 
 We normalize the wage rate such that w =1. Totally differentiating the indirect utility 
function with respect to tc yields: 
                                C C F
c c C c c C c F c
dV V dR V d V d V dP V dP
dt R dt dt dt P dt P dt
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                      (A3.9) 
where the partial derivatives come from the objective function, 
                                   '; ; ; ;
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                      (A3.10) 
and the total derivatives are obtained from constraints (A3.1') and  (A3.2–4) 
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                         1 ; ; ;SC C L C EC
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                   (A3.11) 
 Totally differentiating equation (A3.6') with respect to tc, we obtain 
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where the effect of a change in the tax credit on the labor supply in the economy is: 
                                     
SL C C F
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C
dt dt P dt dt P dt 
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Substituting equation (A3.13) into (A3.12), invoking equation (A1.15), and rearranging, obtains  
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Finally, the optimality condition for a blend mandate is derived by substituting the 
derivatives (A3.10), (A3.11), and (A3.14) into equation (A3.9) and collecting the terms 
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Appendix 4: Derivations for the Numerical Model 
 
The utility-maximizing demand functions can be found in two stages.  We first focus on 
the inner nest of the utility function. Here, minimization of total expenditures on fuel, corn, and 
the numeraire good, subject to X = 1, yields the proportions of individual consumption goods in 
one unit of the composite good X.
30
 These proportions are constant with respect to the level of X 
and are denoted by bF = F/X, bC = C/X, and bx = x/X, respectively. Thus, the first-stage problem 
is:
31
 
, ,
min F C x
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resulting in the following demand functions (proportions) for X = 1: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
11 1
11 1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1 1
1
x
xx x
x
xx x
x
F C F x
F F C F C
C F F C F X
C F C x
C C F F C
F C F C C X
F C F CF
x F C F C
F x C
P P
b
P P
P P
b
P P
P
b
P

 

 

 
   
   
 
   
   
   
   
 
 
 

   
                
   
                
    
     
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 The optimal demands from the first stage provide the price index PX (price of the 
aggregate consumption good X), defined as  
X F F C C x xP b P b P b P    
                                                          
30
 That is, how much of fuel, corn, and the numeraire good is needed to produce one unit of the composite good at a 
minimum cost. 
31
 Note that for X = 1, bF = F, bC = C, and bx = x. 
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The second-stage is utility maximization (outer nest) between leisure and the composite 
consumption good
32
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subject to: 
(1 ) (1 )X L L X CP X w t N w t L P         
resulting in demand for leisure and the composite good: 
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32
 Recall that the consumer sees the level of the externality R as exogenous and thus does not take it into 
consideration when choosing his optimal consumption bundle. 
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Appendix 5: Determination of the Time-Endowment Ratio 
 
We follow Ballard (2000) to determine the time-endowment ratio  (i.e., the 
representative consumer’s endowment of time divided by the amount of labor that is supplied in 
the baseline) that is consistent with uncompensated price and income labor-supply elasticities 
found in the literature.  Because the utility function used in our paper differs from that in Ballard 
(2000), below we rederive the calibration procedure. 
The representative consumer maximizes his utility, subject to the budget constraint 
1 1 1
max (1 )N NU N X

  
  
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subject to: 
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where (1 )Lw t    
The resulting demands for leisure N and the composite consumption good X are 
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The uncompensated leisure-demand elasticity N is  
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Rearranging the leisure demand function, we obtain 
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C
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53 
 
And substituting into equation (5.1), we arrive at 
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                           (A5.3) 
The relationship between uncompensated and compensated labor supply elasticity is (see 
Ballard, 2000) 
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Solving equations (A5.3) and (A5.4) for δ and αN, we obtain  
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     The indirect utility function corresponding to the consumer’s utility maximization 
problem above is  
                                    
1
1 1 1 11C X N NV L REV P
                
 
              (A5.5) 
And the expenditure function is given by 
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By Shepard’s Lemma, we have  * * 1 1 11N X N NE N V P
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Slutsky derivative is  
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compensated leisure supply elasticity we have 
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The relation between compensated elasticities for labor and leisure supply is given by 
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                                                                   * *1L N                                                     (A5.8) 
 Because by the Slutsky decomposition the difference between the compensated and 
uncompensated labor supply elasticities is equal to the absolute value of the total-income 
elasticity of labor supply (Ballard, 2000), the closing condition for our calibration is  
                                                                   *
L L I                                                      (A5.9) 
which implicitly solves for the time-endowment ratio . 
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Appendix 6: Supplementary Tables 
 
Table A1. Data Used to Calibrate the Model
Variable/parameter Symbol Value Unit Source
PARAMETERS
Carbon emissions of corn ethanol relative to gasoline ξ 0.80 de Gorter and Just (2010)
Miles per gallon of ethanol relative to gasoline γ 0.70 de Gorter and Just (2010)
Ethanol produced from one bushel of corn β 2.80 gallon/bushel Eidman (2007)
DDGS production coefficient 
a μ 17/56 Eidman (2007)
Price of DDGS relative to corn price r 0.86 r = (PDDGS*56)/(PC*2000)
Share of DDGS in one bushel of corn δC 0.26 δC = r*μ
Marginal product of corn in ethanol production eC 3.78 gallon/bushel β/(1-δC)
Marginal product of labor in ethanol production eL 1.25 gallon/hour eC*w/(eC*Pe-PC)
Marginal external cost of CO2 emissions 
b MEC 0.06 $/gallon Parry and Small (2005)
Share parameter of fuel consumption in utility αF 2.89E-06 Calibrated using equation for bF in Appendix 4
Share parameter of corn consumption in utility αC 9.63E-10 Calibrated using equation for bC in Appendix 4
Scale factor on composite consumption good in utility σX 1.06 Calibrated using the constraint in Appendix 4
Labor endowment as proportion of labor Φ 1.19 Appendix 5
Share parameter of leisure consumption in utility αN 0.13 Appendix 5
Returns to scale in corn production ε
S 0.23 ε
CS
/(ε
CS
+1)
Labor share of income ρ 0.57 U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis 
c
Marginal product of labor in numeraire production k 1.00 k = w/Px
Scale parameter for the corn production function A 7.50 A = C
S
^(1-ԑ
S
)/(ԑ
S
*PC/w)^ԑ
S
Marginal product of labor in gasoline production B 0.57 B = w/PG
POLICY VARIABLES
Ethanol tax credit tc 0.50 $/gallon tc = $0.45/gal. + $0.048/gal. 
d
Blend mandate (energy equivalent) θ 0.06 θ = E/F
Fuel tax t 0.49 $/gallon American Petroleum Institute 
e
Labor tax (ad valorem) tL 0.40 Goulder et al. (1999)
After-tax wage ω 0.60 ω = w*(1-tL)
PRICES
Wage w 1.00 $/hour Normalized
Price of the numeraire good Px 1.00 Normalized
Price of the composite good PX 1.00 Normalized to unity in the baseline
Gasoline price PG 1.76 $/gallon Gasoline average rack price in Omaha, Nebraska 
f
Ethanol price (volumetric) Pe 1.79 $/gallon Ethanol average rack price in Omaha, Nebraska 
f
Ethanol price (energy) PE 2.56 $/GEEG PE = Pe/γ
Fuel price PF 2.27 $/GEEG PF = θ*(PE + t/γ - tc/γ) + (1-θ)*(PG + t)
Corn market price PC 3.75 $/bushel USDA 
g
DDGS price PDDGS 114.40 $/ton USDA
 h
Notes:
a 
DDGS = Dried distillers grains with solubles
b
 Corresponds to $25/tonne carbon
c 
http://www.bea.gov/national/index.htm#gdp
d 
$0.45/gallon is the federal component of the tax credit; the $0.048/gallon is the average state tax credit reported by Koplow (2009).
e
 http://www.api.org/statistics/fueltaxes/upload/gasoline-diesel-summary.pdf (average for 2009)
f
 http://www.neo.ne.gov/statshtml/66.html
g
 http://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/feed-grains-database/feed-grains-yearbook-tables.aspx
h
 http://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/feed-grains-database/feed-grains-yearbook-tables.aspx#26818
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Appendix A1. Data Used to Calibrate the Model (continued)
Variable/parameter Symbol Value Unit Source
QUANTITIES
U.S. gross domestic product GDP 13939.00 billion dollars U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis 
c
Time endowment L¯ 9434.96 billion hours L¯ = ΦL
Labor supply L 7945.23 billion hours ρ*GDP/w
Leisure demand N 1489.73 billion hours N = L¯- L
Labor used in gasoline production LG 217.74 billion hours LG = G/B
Labor used in ethanol production Le 8.83 billion hours Le = e/eL
Labor used in corn production LC 11.36 billion hours LC = (w/(ε
S
*A*PC))^(1/(ε
S
-1))
Labor used in numeraire production Lx 7707.30 billion hours Lx = L - Le - Lc - LG
Nominal government revenue REV 3238.65 billion dollars REV = w*tL*L + t*f - tc*e
Real government transfer Γ 3238.65 billion dollars REV/PX
Gasoline supply G 123.71 billion gallons G = f - e
Ethanol consumption (volumetric) e 11.04 billion gallons EIA 
i
Ethanol consumption (energy) E 7.73 bullion GEEGs E = γ*e
Fuel consumption (volumetric) f 134.75 billion gallons EIA 
i
Fuel consumption (energy) F 131.44 bullion GEEGs F = G + E
Corn supply C
S 13.15 billion bushels USDA 
j 
Non-ethanol corn consumption C 10.23 billion bushels C = C
S
-C
e
Corn used for ethanol production C
e 2.92 billion bushels C
e
 = e/eC
Numeraire consumption x 7707.30 x = kLx
Composite good consumption X 8040.58 X = N*(ω*(1-αN)/(αN*PX))^δ
Profits in corn production πC 37.88 billion dollars PC*C
S
 - w*Lc
Externality R 129.89 R = G + ξE
ELASTICITIES
Elasticity of corn supply ε
CS 0.30 Cui et al. (2011)
Income elasticity of labor supply ε
LI -0.10 Ballard (2000)
Uncompensated elasticty of labor supply ε
LL 0.10 Ballard (2000)
Elasticity of substitution between leisure and consumption δ 1.19 Appendix 5
Elasticity of substitution among consumption goods δX 0.30
Chosen to correspond to elasticities of demand for fuel  and 
corn from the literature.
Notes:
i
 http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/steo/query/
j
 http://www.ers.usda.gov/Data/FeedGrains/FeedYearbook.aspx (Table 4)
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Status Quo
Tax Credit 
Removed
No Ethanol 
Policies
Ethanol tax credit ($/gallon) 0.498 0.000 0.000
Blend mandate (%), energy equivalent 5.88 5.88 0.00
Fuel tax ($/gallon) 0.490 0.490 0.490
Fuel price ($/GEEG) 2.268 2.309 2.250
Ethanol price ($/GEEG) 2.557 2.554 N/A
Corn price ($/bushel) 3.745 3.738 2.468
Labor tax rate 0.4000 0.3996 0.3983
Fuel quantity (billion gallons) 134.75 134.04 131.84
Fuel quantity (billion GEEGs) 131.44 130.74 131.84
Gasoline quantity (billion gallons) 123.71 123.06 131.84
Ethanol quantity (billion gallons) 11.038 10.979 0.000
Corn quantity (billion bushels) 10.232 10.239 11.604
Total corn supply (billion bushels) 13.150 13.142 11.604
Labor supply (billion hours) 7945.2 7945.2 7951.6
Price level 1.000 1.001 0.998
Net fuel tax revenue ($ billion) 61 66 65
Total government revenue ($ billion) 3239 3241 3232
Total emissions* 129.89 129.21 131.84
* Emissions units are defined such that 1 gallon gasoline = 1 unit of emissions
N/A: "Not applicable"
Source: calculated
Table A2. Description of Market Equilibrium with Alternate Policy Scenarios
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Table A3. Description of Market Equilibria for Table 3 Scenarios
Pre-existing distortion(s)
Policy description Mandate 
* Equivalent 
tax credit
No ethanol 
policy
Mandate
Equivalent 
tax credit
No ethanol 
policy
Mandate
Equivalent 
tax credit
No ethanol 
policy
Ethanol tax credit ($/gallon) 0.000 0.703 0.000 0.000 0.850 0.000 0.000 0.583 0.000
Fuel tax ($/gallon) 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.00 0.00 0.00
Fuel price ($/GEEG) 2.31 2.25 2.25 2.32 2.25 2.25 1.81 1.76 1.76
Ethanol price ($/GEEG) 2.55 2.55 N/A 2.76 2.76 N/A 2.59 2.59 N/A
Corn price ($/bushel) 3.74 3.74 2.47 4.29 4.29 2.79 3.84 3.84 2.46
Labor tax rate 0.3996 0.4001 0.3983 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4045 0.4050 0.4031
Fuel quantity (billion gallons) 134.0 135.0 131.8 144.1 145.4 141.9 143.9 145.0 141.6
Fuel quantity (billion GEEGs) 130.7 131.7 131.8 140.6 141.9 141.9 140.4 141.5 141.6
Gasoline quantity (billion gallons) 123.1 124.1 131.8 132.3 133.6 141.9 132.1 133.2 141.6
Ethanol quantity (billion gallons) 10.98 10.98 0.00 11.81 11.81 0.00 11.79 11.79 0.00
Corn quantity (billion bushels) 10.24 10.24 11.60 10.58 10.58 12.04 10.13 10.13 11.59
Total corn supply (billion bushels) 13.14 13.14 11.60 13.70 13.70 12.04 13.25 13.25 11.59
Labor supply (billion hours) 7945 7945 7952 8558 8559 8560 7945 7945 7952
Price level 1.0007 0.9997 0.9980 1.0016 1.0004 0.9984 0.9924 0.9915 0.9897
Net fuel tax revenue ($ billion) 66 58 65 71 61 70 0 -7 0
Government revenue ($ billion) 3241 3238 3232 70.65 61.26 69.57 3214 3211 3205
Total emissions
**
129.2 130.2 131.8 138.9 140.2 141.9 138.7 139.8 141.6
Welfare change from policy removal ($ 
billion)
7.096 6.607 N/A 6.296 5.693 N/A 7.227 7.269 N/A
*
 5.88 percent (energy equvalent)
**
 Emissions units are defined such that 1 gallon gasoline = 1 unit of emissions
N/A: "Not applicable"
Source: calculated
Fuel tax and labor tax Fuel tax Labor tax
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